Total Infrastructure Compromise

How we breach retail networks…

 

Audio Version:

We recently delivered an Advanced Persistent Threat  (APT) Penetration Test to one of our customers. People who know us know that when we say APT we’re not just using buzz words.  Our APT services maintain a 98% success rate at compromise while our unrestricted methodology maintains a 100% success at compromise to date.  (In fact we offer a challenge to back up our stats.  If we don’t penetrate with our unrestricted methodology then your test is free. If we do get in then you pay us an extra 10%.)  Lets begin the story about a large retail customer that wanted our APT services.

When we deliver covert engagements we don’t use the everyday and largely ineffective low and slow methodology.  Instead, we use a realistic offensive methodology that incorporates distributed scanning, the use of custom tools, zero-day malware (RADON) among other things.  We call this methodology Real Time Dynamic Testing™ because it’s delivered in real time and is dynamic.  At the core of our methodology are components normally reserved for vulnerability research and exploit development.  Needless to say, our methodology has teeth.

Our customer (the target) wanted a single /23 attacked during the engagement. The first thing that we did was to perform reconnaissance against the /23 so that we knew what we were up against.  Reconnaissance in this case involved distributed scanning and revealed a large number of http and https services running on 149 live targets.  The majority of the pages were uninteresting and provided static content while a few provided dynamic content.

While evaluating the dynamic pages we came across one that was called Make Boss. The application was appeared to be custom built for the purpose of managing software builds. What really snagged our attention was […]

Don’t become a Target

All of the recent news about Target, Neiman Marcus, and other businesses being hacked might be a surprise to many but it’s no surprise to us. Truth is that practice of security has devolved into a political image focused designed satisfy technically inept regulatory requirements that do little or nothing to protect critical business assets. What’s worse is that many security companies are capitalizing on this devolution rather than providing effective solutions in the spirit of good security. This is especially true with regards to the penetration testing industry.

We all know that money is the lifeblood of business and that a failure to meet regulatory requirements threatens that lifeblood. After all, when a business is not in compliance it runs the risk of being fined or not being allowed to operate. In addition the imaginary expenses associated with true security are often perceived as a financial burden (another lifeblood threat). This is usually because the RoI of good security is only apparent when a would-be compromise is prevented. Too many business managers are of the opinion that “it won’t happen to us” until they become a target and it does. These combined ignorant views degrade the overall importance of real security and make the satisfaction of regulatory requirements the top priority. This is unfortunate given that compliance often has little to do with actual security.

Most regulatory requirements are so poorly defined they can be satisfied with the most basic solution. For example PCI-DSS requires merchants to undergo regular penetration tests and yet it completely fails to define the minimum level of threat (almost synonymous with quality) that those tests should be delivered at. This lack of clear definition gives business owners the ability to […]

Whistleblower Series – The real problem with China isn’t China, its you.

Terms like China, APT and Zero-Day are synonymous with Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD).  The trouble is that, in our opinion anyway, these terms and respective news articles detract from the actual problem.  For example, in 2011 only 0.12% of compromises were attributed to zero-day exploitation and 99.88% were attributed to known vulnerabilities.  Yet, despite this fact the media continued to write about the zero-day threat as if it was a matter of urgency.  What they really should have been writing about is that the majority of people aren’t protecting their networks properly.  After all, if 99.88% of all compromises were the result of the exploitation of known vulnerabilities then someone must not have been doing their job. Moreover, if people are unable to protect their networks from the known threat then how are they ever going to defend against the unknown?

All of the recent press about China and their Advanced Persistent Threat is the same, it detracts from the real problem.  More clearly, the problem isn’t China, Anonymous, LulzSec, or any other FUD ridden buzzword.  The problem is that networks are not being maintained properly from a security perspective and so threats are aligning with risks to successfully affect penetration.  A large part of the reason why these networks are such soft targets is because  their maintainers are sold a false sense of security from both the services and technology perspective.

In this article we’ll show you how easy it was for us to hack into a sensitive government network that was guarded by industry technologies and testing best practices.  Our techniques deliberately mimicked those used by China.  You’ll notice that the  techniques aren’t particularly advanced (despite the fact that the press calls them Advanced) and in fact are […]

Whistleblower Series – Don’t be naive, take the time to read and understand the proposal.

In our last whistleblower article, we showed that the vast majority of Penetration Testing vendors don’t actually sell Penetration Tests. We did this by deconstructing pricing methodologies and combining the results with common sense. We’re about to do the same thing to the industry average Penetration Testing proposal. Only this time we’re not just going to be critical of the vendors, we’re also going to be critical of the buyers.

A proposal is a written offer from seller to buyer that defines what services or products are being sold. When you take your car to the dealer, the dealer gives you a quote for work (the proposal). That proposal always contains an itemized list for parts and labor as well as details on what work needs to be done. That is the right way to build a service-based proposal.

The industry average Network Penetration Testing proposal fails to define the services being offered. Remember, the word ‘define’ means the exact meaning of something. When we read a network penetration testing proposal and we have to ask ourselves “so what is this vendor going to do for us?” then the proposal has clearly failed to define services.

For example, just recently we reviewed a proposal that talked about “Ethos” and offered optional services called “External Validation” and “External Quarterlies” but completely failed to explain what “External Validation” and “External Quarterlies” were. We also don’t really care about “Ethos” because it has nothing to do with the business offering. Moreover, this same proposal absolutely failed to define methodology and did not provide any insight into how testing would be done. The pricing section was simply a single line item with a dollar value, it wasn’t itemized. Sure the document […]

The 3 ways we owned you in 2012

Here are the top 3 risks that we leveraged to penetrate into our customers’ networks in 2012. Each of these has been used to affect an irrecoverable infrastructure compromise during multiple engagements across a range of different customers. We flag a compromise “irrecoverable” when we’ve successfully taken administrative control over 60% or more of the network-connected assets. You’ll notice that these risks are more human-oriented than they are technology-oriented, thus demonstrating that your people are your greatest risk. While we certainly do focus on technological risks, they don’t fall into the top three categories.

The general methodology that we follow to achieve an irrecoverable infrastructure compromise is depicted below at a high-level.

Gain entry via a single point (one of the 3 referenced below)
Install custom backdoor (RADON our safe, undetectable, home-grown pseudo-malware)
Identify and penetrate the domain controller (surprisingly easy in most cases)
Extract and crack the passwords (we have pretty rainbows and access to this GPU cracker)
Propagate the attack to the rest of the network (Distributed Metastasis)

 
Social Engineering
Social Engineering is the art of manipulating people into divulging information or performing actions usually for the purpose of gaining access to a computer system or network connected resource. It is similar to fraud, but the attacker very rarely comes face-to-face with his or her victims. Today, Social Engineering is used to help facilitate the delivery of technological attacks like the planting of malware, spy devices, etc.

During an engagement in 2012, Netragard used Social Engineering to execute an irrecoverable infrastructure compromise against one of its healthcare customers. This was done through a job opportunity that was posted on our customers website. Specifically, our customer was looking to hire a Web Application Developer that understood how to design secure applications. We built an irresistible resume and established fake references, which quickly landed us an […]

Thank You Anonymous

We (Netragard) have been meaning to say Thank You to Anonymous for a long time now. With that said, Netragard does not condone the actions of Anonymous, nor the damage they have caused.   What Anonymous has demonstrated, and continues to demonstrate, is just how poorly most network infrastructures are managed from a security perspective (globally, not just within the USA).  People need to wake up.

If you take the time to look at most of the hacks done by Anonymous, you’ll find that their primary points of entry are really quite basic.  They often involve the exploitation of simple SQL Injection vulnerabilities, poorly configured servers, or even basic Social Engineering.  We’re not convinced that Anonymous is talentless; we just think that they haven’t had to use their talent because the targets are so soft.

What Anonymous has really exposed here are issues with the security industry as a whole and with the customers that are being serviced. Many of Anonymous’s victims use third party Penetration Testing vendors and nightly Vulnerability Scanning services.  Many of them even use “best of breed” Intrusion Prevention Systems and “state of the art” firewalls.  Despite this, Anonymous still succeeds at Penetration with relative ease, without detection and by exploiting easy to identify vulnerabilities.  So the question becomes, why is Anonymous so successful?

Part of the reason is that regulatory requirements like PCI DSS 11.3 (and others) shift businesses from wanting Penetration Tests for security reasons to needing Penetration Tests in order to satisfy regulatory requirements.  What is problematic is that most regulatory requirements provide no minimum quality standard for Penetration Testing.  They also provide no incentive for quality testing.  As a result, anyone with an automated vulnerability scanner and the ability […]

Hacking the Sonexis ConferenceManager

Netragard’s Penetration Testing services use a research based methodology called Real Time Dynamic Testing™. Research based methodologies are different in that they focus on identifying both new and known vulnerabilities whereas standard methodologies usually, if not always identify known vulnerabilities. Sometimes when performing research based penetration testing we identify issues that not only affect our customer but also have the potential to impact anyone using a particular technology. Such was the case with the Sonexis ConfrenceManager.

The last time we came across a Sonexis ConferenceManager we found a never before discovered Blind SQL Injection vulnerability.  This time we found a much more serious (also never before discovered) authorization vulnerability. We felt that this discovery deserved a blog entry to help make people aware of the issue as quickly as possible.

What really surprised about this vulnerability was its simplicity and the fact that nobody (not even us) had found it before.  Discovery and exploitation required no wizardry or special talent. We simply had to browse to the affected area of the application and we were given keys to the kingdom (literally). What was even more scary is that this vulnerability could lead to a mass compromise if automated with a specialized Google search (but we won’t give more detail on that here, yet).

So lets dig in…

All versions of the Sonexis ConferenceManager fail to check and see if users attempting to access  the “/admin/backup/settings.asp”, “/admin/backup/download.asp ” or the “/admin/backup/upload.asp ” pages are authorized. Because of this, anyone can browse to one of those pages without first authenticating.  When they do, they’ll have full administrative privileges over the respective Sonexis ConferenceManager pages.  A screen shot of the “settings.asp” age is provided below.

The first thing that we noticed when we accessed the page was that the fields were […]

Netragard’s Badge of Honor (Thank you McAfee)

Here at Netragard We Protect You From People Like Us™ and we mean it.  We don’t just run automated scans, massage the output, and draft you a report that makes you feel good.  That’s what many companies do.  Instead, we “hack” you with a methodology that is driven by hands on research, designed to create realistic and elevated levels of threat.  Don’t take our word for it though; McAfee has helped us prove it to the world.

Through their Threat Intelligence service, McAfee Labs listed Netragard as a “High Risk” due to the level of threat that we produced during a recent engagement.  Specifically, we were using a beta variant of our custom Meterbreter malware (not to be confused with Metasploit’s Meterpreter) during an Advanced Penetration Testing engagement.  The beta malware was identified and submitted to McAfee via our customers Incident Response process.  The result was that McAfee listed Netragard as a “High Risk”, which caught our attention (and our customers attention) pretty quickly.

McAfee was absolutely right; we are “High Risk”, or more appropriately, “High Threat”, which in our opinion is critically important when delivering quality Penetration Testing services.  After all, the purpose of a Penetration Test (with regards to I.T security) is to identify the presence of points where a real threat can make its way into or through your IT Infrastructure.  Testing at less than realistic levels of threat is akin to testing a bulletproof vest with a squirt gun.

Netragard uses a methodology that’s been dubbed Real Time Dynamic Testing™ (“RTDT”).  Real Time Dynamic Testing™ is a research driven methodology specifically designed to test the Physical, Electronic (networked and standalone) and Social attack surfaces at a level of threat that is slightly greater […]

Netragard’s Hacker Interface Device (HID).

We (Netragard) recently completed an engagement for a client with a rather restricted scope. The scope included a single IP address bound to a firewall that offered no services what so ever. It also excluded the use of social attack vectors based on social networks, telephone, or email and disallowed any physical access to the campus and surrounding areas. With all of these limitations in place, we were tasked with penetrating into the network from the perspective of a remote threat, and succeeded.

The first method of attack that people might think of when faced with a challenge like this is the use of the traditional autorun malware on a USB stick. Just mail a bunch of sticks to different people within the target company and wait for someone to plug it in; when they do its game over, they’re infected. That trick worked great back in the day but not so much any more. The first issue is that most people are well aware of the USB stick threat due to the many published articles about the subject. The second is that more and more companies are pushing out group policies that disable the autorun feature in Windows systems. Those two things don’t eliminate the USB stick threat, but they certainly have a significant impact on its level of success and we wanted something more reliable.

Enter PRION, the evil HID.

 

A prion is an infectious agent composed of a protein in a misfolded form. In our case the prion isn’t composed of proteins but instead is composed of electronics which include a teensy microcontroller, a micro USB hub (small one from RadioShack), a mini USB cable (we […]

Netragard Signage Snatching

Recently Netragard has had a few discussions with owners and operators of sports arenas, with the purpose of identifying methods in which a malicious hacker could potentially disrupt a sporting event, concert, or other large scale and highly visible event.

During the course of the these conversations, the topic of discussion shifted from network exploitation to social engineering, with a focus on compromise of the digital signage systems.  Until recently, even I hadn’t thought about how extensively network controlled signage systems are used in facilities like casinos, sports arenas, airports, and roadside billboards.  That is, until our most recent casino project.

Netragard recently completed a Network Penetration Test and Social Engineering Test for a large west coast casino, with spectacular results. Not only were our engineers able to gain the keys to the kingdom, they were also able to gain access to the systems that had supervisory control for every single digital sign in the facility.  Some people may think to themselves, “ok, what’s the big deal with that?”.  The answer is simple:  Customer perception and corporate image.

Before I continue on, let me provide some background; Early in 2008, there were two incidents in California where two on-highway digital billboards were compromised, and their displays changed from the intended display.  While both of these incidents were small pranks in comparison to what they could have done, the effect was remembered by those who drove by and saw the signs.  (Example A, Example B)

Another recent billboard hack in Moscow, Russia, wasn’t as polite as the pranksters in California.  A hacker was able to gain control of a billboard in downtown Moscow (worth noting, Moscow is the 7th largest city in the world), and after subsequently gaining access, […]

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