Archive for the ‘Software’ Category

83% of businesses have no established security plan (but they’ve got Kool-Aid)

I (Adriel) read an article published by Charles Cooper of c|net regarding small businesses and their apparent near total lack of awareness with regards to security.  The article claims that 77% of small- and medium-sized businesses think that they are secure yet 83% of those businesses have no established security plan.  These numbers were based on a survey of 1,015 small- and medium-sized businesses that was carried out by the National Cyber Security Alliance and Symantec.

These numbers don’t surprise me at all and, in fact, I think that this false sense of security is an epidemic across businesses of all sizes, not just small-to-medium.  The question that people haven’t asked is why does this false sense of security exist in such a profound way? Are people really ok with feeling safe when they are in fact vulnerable?  Perhaps they are being lied to and are drinking the Kool-Aid…

What I mean is this.  How many software vendors market their products as secure only to have someone identify all sorts of critical vulnerabilities in it later?  Have you ever heard a software vendor suggest that their software might not be highly secure?  Not only is the suggestion that all software is secure an absurd one, but it is a blatant lie.  A more truthful statement is that all software is vulnerable unless it is mathematically demonstrated to be flawless (which by the way is a near impossibility).

Very few software vendors hire third-party  vulnerability discovery and exploitation experts to perform genuine reviews of their products. This is why I always recommend using a third-party service (like us) to vet the software from a security perspective before making a purchase decision.  If the software vendor wants to be privy to the results then they should pay for the engagement because in the end it will improve the product. Why should you (their prospective customer) pay to have their product improved?  Shouldn’t that be their responsibility?  Shouldn’t they be doing this as a part of the software development lifecycle?

Security vendors are equally responsible for promoting a false sense of security.  For example, how many antivirus companies market their technology in such a way that might be perceived as an end-all, be-all solution to email threats, viruses, and trojans, etc.,? Have you ever heard antivirus software vendors say anything like “we will protect you from most viruses, worms, etc.”?  Of course not. That level of honesty would leave doubt in the minds of their customers, which would impede sales.  Truth is, their customers should have doubt because antivirus products are only partially effective and can be  subverted, as we’ve demonstrated before.  Despite this fact, uninformed people still feel safe because they use antivirus software.

Let’s not only pick on antivirus software companies though, what about companies that are supposed to test the security of networks and information systems (like us for example)?  We discussed this a bit during our “Thank You Anonymous” blog entry.   Most businesses that sell penetration testing services don’t deliver genuine penetration tests despite the fact that they call their services penetration testing services.  What they really sell is the manually vetted product of an automated vulnerability scan.  Moreover, they call this vetting process “manual testing” and so their customers believe they’ve received a quality penetration test when in fact they are depending on an automated program like Nessus to find flaws in their customer networks.  This is the equivalent of testing a bulletproof vest with a squirt gun and claiming that its been tested with a .50 caliber rifle.  Would you want to wear that vest in battle?

It seems to me that security businesses are so focused on revenue generation that they’ve lost sight of the importance of providing clear, factual, complete and balanced information to the public.  It’s my opinion that their competitive marketing methodologies are a detriment to security and actually help to promote the false sense of security referenced in the c|net article above.  Truth is that good security includes the class of products that I’ve mentioned above but that those products are completely useless without capable, well-informed security experts behind them.  Unfortunately not all security experts are actually experts either (but that’s a different story)…

 

 

 

 

 

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Selling zero-day’s doesn’t increase your risk, here’s why.

The zero-day exploit market is secretive. People as a whole tend to fear what they don’t understand and substitute fact with speculation.  While very few facts about the zero-day exploit market are publicly available, there are many facts about zero-days that are available.  When those facts are studied it becomes clear that the legitimate zero-day exploit market presents an immeasurably small risk (if any), especially when viewed in contrast with known risks.

Many news outlets, technical reporters, freedom of information supporters, and even security experts have used the zero-day exploit market to generate Fear Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD).  While the concept of a zero-day exploit seems ominous reality is actually far less menacing.  People should be significantly more worried about vulnerabilities that exist in public domain than those that are zero-day.  The misrepresentations about the zero-day market create a dangerous distraction from the very real issues at hand.

One of the most common misrepresentations is that the zero-day exploit market plays a major role in the creation of malware and malware’s ability to spread.  Not only is this categorically untrue but the Microsoft Security Intelligence Report (SIRv11) provides clear statistics that show that malware almost never uses zero-day exploits.  According to SIRv11, less than 6% of malware infections are actually attributed to the exploitation of general vulnerabilities.  Of those successful infections nearly all target known and not zero-day vulnerabilities.

Malware targets and exploits gullibility far more frequently than technical vulnerabilities.  The “ILOVEYOU” worm is a prime example.  The worm would email its self to a victim with a subject of “I LOVE YOU” and an attachment titled “LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.txt.vbs”. The attachment was actually a copy of the worm.  When a person attempted to read the attachment they would inadvertently run the copy and infect their own computer.  Once infected the worm would begin the process again and email copies of its self to the first 50 email addresses in the victims address book.  This technique of exploiting gullibility was so successful that in the first 10 days over 50 million infections were reported.  Had people spent more time educating each other about the risks of socially augmented technical attacks then the impact may have been significantly reduced.

The Morris worm is an example of a worm that did exploit zero-day vulnerabilities to help its spread.  The Morris was created in 1988 and proliferated by exploiting multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in various Internet connectable services.  The worm was not intended to be malicious but ironically a design flaw caused it to malfunction, which resulted in a Denial of Service condition of the infected systems.  The Morris worm existed well before zero-day exploit market was even a thought thus proving that both malware and zero-day exploits will exist with or without the market.  In fact, there is no evidence that shows the existence of any relationship between the legitimate zero-day exploit market and the creation of malware, there is only speculation.

Despite these facts, prominent security personalities have argued that the zero-day exploit market keeps people at risk by preventing the public disclosure of zero-day vulnerabilities. Bruce Schneier wrote, “a disclosed vulnerability is one that – at least in most cases – is patched”.  His opinion is both assumptive and erroneous yet shared by a large number of security professionals.  Reality is that when a vulnerability is disclosed it is unveiled to both ethical and malicious parties. Those who are responsible for applying patches don’t respond as quickly as those with malicious intent.

According to SIRv11, 99.88% of all compromises were attributed to the exploitation of known (publicly disclosed) and not zero-day vulnerabilities.  Of those vulnerabilities over 90% had been known for more than one year. Only 0.12% of compromises reported were attributed to the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities. Without the practice of public disclosure or with the responsible application of patches the number of compromises identified in SIRv11 would have been significantly reduced.

The Verizon 2012 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) also provides some interesting insight into compromises.  According to DBIR 97% of breaches were avoidable through simple or intermediate controls (known / detectable vulnerabilities, etc.), 92% were discovered by a third party and 85% took two weeks or more to discover. These statistics further demonstrate that networks are not being managed responsibly. People, and not the legitimate zero-day exploit market, are keeping themselves at risk by failing to responsibly address known vulnerabilities.  A focus on zero-day defense is an unnecessary distraction for most.

Another issue is the notion that security researchers should give their work away for free.  Initially it was risky for researchers to notify vendors about security flaws in their technology.  Some vendors attempted to quash the findings with legal threats and others would treat researchers with such hostility that it would drive the researchers to the black market.  Some vendors remain hostile even today, but most will happily accept a researchers hard work provided that its delivered free of charge.  To us the notion that security researchers should give their work away for free is absurd.

Programs like ZDI and what was once iDefense (acquired by VeriSign) offer relatively small bounties to researchers who provide vulnerability information.  When a new vulnerability is reported these programs notify their paying subscribers well in advance of the general public.  They do make it a point to work with the manufacturer to close the hole but only after they’ve made their bounty.  Once the vendors have been notified (and ideally a fix created) public disclosure ensues in the form of an email-based security advisory that is sent to various email lists.  At that point, those who have not applied the fix are at a significantly increased level of risk.

Companies like Google and Microsoft are stellar examples of what software vendors should do with regards to vulnerability bounty programs.  Their programs motivate the research community to find and report vulnerabilities back to the vendor.  The existence of these programs is a testament to how seriously both Google and Microsoft take product security. Although these companies (and possibly others) are moving in the right direction, they still have to compete with prices offered by other legitimate zero-day buyers.  In some cases those prices offered are as much as 50% higher.

Netragard is one of those entities. We operate the Exploit Acquisition Program (EAP), which was established in early 2000 as a way to provide ethical security researchers with top dollar for their work product. In 2011 Netragard’s minimum acquisition price (payment to researcher) was $20,000.00, which is significantly greater than the minimum payout from most other programs.  Netragard’s EAP buyer information, as with any business’ customer information, is kept in the highest confidence.  Netragard’s EAP does not practice public vulnerability disclosure for the reasons cited above.

Unlike VUPEN, Netragard will only sell its exploits to US based buyers under contract.  This decision was made to prevent the accidental sale of zero-day exploits to potentially hostile third parties and to prevent any distribution to the Black Market.  Netragard also welcomes the exclusive sale of vulnerability information to software vendors who wish fix their own products.  Despite this not one single vendor has approached Netragard with the intent to purchase vulnerability information.  This seems to indicate that most software vendors are sill more focused on revenue than they are end-user security.  This is unfortunate because software vendors are the source of vulnerabilities.

Most software vendors do not hire developers that are truly proficient at writing safe code (the proof is in the statistics). Additionally, very few software vendors have genuine security testing incorporated into their Quality Assurance process.  As a result, software vendors literally (and usually accidently) create the vulnerabilities that are exploited by hackers and used to compromise their customer’s networks. Yet software vendors continue to inaccurately tout their software as being secure when in fact t isn’t.

If software vendors begin to produce truly secure software then the zero-day exploit market will cease to exist or will be forced to make dramatic transformations. Malware however would continue to thrive because it is not exploit dependent.  We are hopeful that Google and Microsoft will be trend setters and that other software vendors will follow suit.  Finally, we are hopeful that people will do their own research about the zero-day exploit markets instead of blindly trusting the largely speculative articles that have been published recently.


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Hacking the Sonexis ConferenceManager

Netragard’s Penetration Testing services use a research based methodology called Real Time Dynamic Testing™. Research based methodologies are different in that they focus on identifying both new and known vulnerabilities whereas standard methodologies usually, if not always identify known vulnerabilities. Sometimes when performing research based penetration testing we identify issues that not only affect our customer but also have the potential to impact anyone using a particular technology. Such was the case with the Sonexis ConfrenceManager.

The last time we came across a Sonexis ConferenceManager we found a never before discovered Blind SQL Injection vulnerability.  This time we found a much more serious (also never before discovered) authorization vulnerability. We felt that this discovery deserved a blog entry to help make people aware of the issue as quickly as possible.

What really surprised about this vulnerability was its simplicity and the fact that nobody (not even us) had found it before.  Discovery and exploitation required no wizardry or special talent. We simply had to browse to the affected area of the application and we were given keys to the kingdom (literally). What was even more scary is that this vulnerability could lead to a mass compromise if automated with a specialized Google search (but we won’t give more detail on that here, yet).

So lets dig in…

All versions of the Sonexis ConferenceManager fail to check and see if users attempting to access  the “/admin/backup/settings.asp”, “/admin/backup/download.asp ” or the “/admin/backup/upload.asp ” pages are authorized. Because of this, anyone can browse to one of those pages without first authenticating.  When they do, they’ll have full administrative privileges over the respective Sonexis ConferenceManager pages.  A screen shot of the “settings.asp” age is provided below.

The first thing that we noticed when we accessed the page was that the fields were filled out for us.  This made us curious, especially since the credentials appeared to belong to our customers domain.  When we looked at the document source we found that we didn’t only have the “User ID:” but were also provided with the “Password:” in clear text.

As it turned out, compromising our customer’s IT infrastructure was as simple as using the disclosed credentials to VPN into their network.  Once in we used the same credentials to access Active Directory and to create a second domain administrator account called “netragard”.  We also downloaded the entire password table from Active Directory and began cracking that with hashcat.  While that was being cracked we used our new domain admin account to access any resource that authenticated against Active Directory.  Suffice it to say we had used the Sonexis ConferenceManager vulnerability to compromise the entire IT infrastructure.

But the vulnerabilities didn’t stop there…

As it turns out we could also download the Sonexis ConferenceManager Microsoft SQL database in its entirety.  This was done by changing the configuration in the “settings.asp” page.  Once changed to the right location we were able to download the database (after configuring samba locally).

 

After we downloaded the file (in zip format) we decompressed it.  Decompression revealed the following contents:

Once decompressed we loaded the files into our local MsSQL database and began to explore the contents.  Not only did we have audio recordings, configuration settings, and other sensitive data, but the administrative password for the Sonexis ConferenceManager was also stored in plain text as is shown in the screen shot below. This in and of its self is yet another vulnerability.

We were able to use the credentials to login to the Sonexis ConferenceManager without issue…

Last but not least…

We found that it was also possible to insert a backdoor into our local copy of the Sonexis ConferenceManager database.  Once the backdoor was created we could re-zip the files and upload the “infected” Microsoft SQL database back to the Sonexis ConferenceManager.  Once loaded, the backdoor will activate allowing the attacker to gain entry to the system (again).

Regarding vendor notification…

Sonexis was notified on 1/31/2012 about the authorization vulnerabilities disclosed in this article.  Sonexis responded once (with a less than friendly, non-cooperative response) on 2/1/2012 and a second time (with a very friendly cooperative response) on 2/6/2012.  We replied to the second response providing the full details of our research to Sonexis.  Sonexis took the information and had a quick fix ready for their customers the next day on 02/07/2012!  They notified their customers that same day with the following email.

We’d like to thank Sonexis for taking the time to be receptive and working with us.  Not only is that the right thing to do, but it showed us that Sonexis takes their customer security very seriously.  As it turned out the initial (less than friendly response) was due to a miscommunication (someone not paying attention to what we were telling them).  The second response came from someone else that was actually a great pleasure to work with.  Suffice it to say that in the end we were really quite impressed with how quickly Sonexis pushed out a fix (and yes it works, we verified that).

If you are a Sonexis ConferenceManager user we strongly urge you to update your system now.

Updated on: 02-16-2012

This vulnerability can be exploited from the Internet.   The image below shows a small sample of Sonexis ConferenceManager users who are vulnerable.  This sample was identified using a combination of ruby with a specially crafted google search.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Netragard’s Badge of Honor (Thank you McAfee)

Here at Netragard We Protect You From People Like Us™ and we mean it.  We don’t just run automated scans, massage the output, and draft you a report that makes you feel good.  That’s what many companies do.  Instead, we “hack” you with a methodology that is driven by hands on research, designed to create realistic and elevated levels of threat.  Don’t take our word for it though; McAfee has helped us prove it to the world.

Through their Threat Intelligence service, McAfee Labs listed Netragard as a “High Risk” due to the level of threat that we produced during a recent engagement.  Specifically, we were using a beta variant of our custom Meterbreter malware (not to be confused with Metasploit’s Meterpreter) during an Advanced Penetration Testing engagement.  The beta malware was identified and submitted to McAfee via our customers Incident Response process.  The result was that McAfee listed Netragard as a “High Risk”, which caught our attention (and our customers attention) pretty quickly.

McAfee Flags Netragard as a High Risk

Badge of Honor

McAfee was absolutely right; we are “High Risk”, or more appropriately, “High Threat”, which in our opinion is critically important when delivering quality Penetration Testing services.  After all, the purpose of a Penetration Test (with regards to I.T security) is to identify the presence of points where a real threat can make its way into or through your IT Infrastructure.  Testing at less than realistic levels of threat is akin to testing a bulletproof vest with a squirt gun.

Netragard uses a methodology that’s been dubbed Real Time Dynamic Testing™ (“RTDT”).  Real Time Dynamic Testing™ is a research driven methodology specifically designed to test the Physical, Electronic (networked and standalone) and Social attack surfaces at a level of threat that is slightly greater than what is likely to be faced in the real world.  Real Time Dynamic Testing™ requires that our Penetration Testers be capable of reverse engineering, writing custom exploits, building and modifying malware, etc.  In fact, the first rendition of our Meterbreter was created as a product of of this methodology.

Another important aspect of Real Time Dynamic Testing™ is the targeting of attack surfaces individually or in tandem.  The “Netragard’s Hacker Interface Device” article is an example of how Real Time Dynamic Testing™ was used to combine Social, Physical and Electronic attacks to achieve compromise against a hardened target.  Another article titled “Facebook from the hackers perspective” provides an example of socially augmented electronic attacks driven by our methodology.

It is important that we thank McAfee for two reasons.  First we thank McAfee for responding to our request to be removed from the “High Risk” list so quickly because it was preventing our customers from being able to access our servers.  Second and possibly more important, we thank McAfee for putting us on their “High Risk” list in the first place.  The mere fact that we were perceived as a “High Risk” by McAfee means that we are doing our job right.

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Netragard’s Hacker Interface Device (HID).

We (Netragard) recently completed an engagement for a client with a rather restricted scope. The scope included a single IP address bound to a firewall that offered no services what so ever. It also excluded the use of social attack vectors based on social networks, telephone, or email and disallowed any physical access to the campus and surrounding areas. With all of these limitations in place, we were tasked with penetrating into the network from the perspective of a remote threat, and succeeded.

The first method of attack that people might think of when faced with a challenge like this is the use of the traditional autorun malware on a USB stick. Just mail a bunch of sticks to different people within the target company and wait for someone to plug it in; when they do its game over, they’re infected. That trick worked great back in the day but not so much any more. The first issue is that most people are well aware of the USB stick threat due to the many published articles about the subject. The second is that more and more companies are pushing out group policies that disable the autorun feature in Windows systems. Those two things don’t eliminate the USB stick threat, but they certainly have a significant impact on its level of success and we wanted something more reliable.

Enter PRION, the evil HID.


 

A prion is an infectious agent composed of a protein in a misfolded form. In our case the prion isn’t composed of proteins but instead is composed of electronics which include a teensy microcontroller, a micro USB hub (small one from RadioShack), a mini USB cable (we needed the ends) a micro flash drive (made from one of our Netragard USB Streamers), some home-grown malware (certainly not designed to be destructive), and a USB device like a mouse, missile turret, dancing stripper, chameleon, or whatever else someone might be tempted to plug in. When they do plug it in, they will be infected by our custom malware and we will use that point of infection to compromise the rest of the network.

For the purposes of this engagement we choose to use a fancy USB logitech mouse as our Hacker Interface Device / Attack Platform. To turn our logitech Human Interface Device into a Hacker Interface Device, we had to make some modifications. The first step of course was to remove the screw from the bottom of the mouse and pop it open. Once we did that we disconnected the USB cable from the circuit board in the mouse and put that to the side. Then we proceed to use a drummel tool to shave away the extra plastic on the inside cover of the mouse. (There were all sorts of tabs that we could sacrifice). The removal of the plastic tabs was to make room for the new hardware.

Once the top of the mouse was gutted and all the unnecessary parts removed we began to focus on the USB hub. The first thing we had to do was to extract the board from the hub. Doing that is a lot harder than it sounds because the hub that we chose was glued together and we didn’t want to risk breaking the internals by being too rough. After about 15 minutes of prying with a small screwdriver (and repeated accidental hand stabbing) we were able to pull the board out from the plastic housing. We then proceeded to strip the female USB connectors off of the board by heating their respective pins to melt the solder (careful not to burn the board). Once those were extracted we were left with a naked USB hub circuit board that measured about half an inch long and was no wider than a small bic lighter.

With the mouse and the USB board prepared we began the process of soldering. The first thing that we did was to take the mini USB cable, cut one of the ends off leaving about 1 inch of wire near the connector. Then we stripped all plastic off of the connector and stripped a small amount of wire from the 4 internal wires. We soldered those four wires to the USB board making sure to follow theright pinout pattern. This is the cable that will plug into the teensy mini USB port when we insert the teensy microcontroller.

Once that was finished we took the USB cable that came with the mouse and cut the circuit board connector off of the end leaving 2 inchs of wire attached. We stripped the tips of the 4 wires still attached to the connector and soldered those to the USB hub making sure to follow the right pinout patterns mentioned above. This is an important cable as its the one that connects the USB hub to the mouse. If this cable is not soldered properly and the connections fail, then the mouse will not work. We then took the other piece of the mouse cable (the longer part) and soldered that to the USB board. This is the cable that will connect the mouse to the USB port on the computer.

At this point we have three cables soldered to the USB hub. Just to recap those cables are the mouse connector cable, the cable that goes from the mouse to the computer, and the mini USB adapter cable for the teensy device. The next and most challenging part of this is to solder the USB flash drive to the USB hub. This is important because the USB flash drive is where we store our malware. If the drive isn’t soldered on properly then we won’t be able to store our malware on the drive and the the attack would be mostly moot. ( We say mostly because we could still instruct the mouse to fetch the malware from a website, but that’s not covert.)

To solder the flash drive to the USB hub we cut about 2 inches of cable from the mini USB connector that we stole the end from previously. We stripped the ends of the wires in the cable and carefully soldered the ends to the correct points on the flash drive. Once that was done we soldered the other ends of the cable to the USB hub. At that point we had everything soldered together and had to fit it all back into the mouse. Assembly was pretty easy because we were careful to use as little material as possible while still giving us the flexibility that we needed. We wrapped the boards and wires in single layers of electrical tape as to avoid any shorts. Once everything was we plugged in we tested the devices. The USB drive mounted, the teensy card was programmable, and the mouse worked.

Time to give prion the ability to infect…

We learned that the client was using Mcafee as their antivirus solution because one of their employees was complaining about it on Facebook. Remember, we weren’t allowed to use social networks for social engineering but we certainly were allowed to do reconnaissance against social networks. With Mcafee in our sights we set out to create custom malware for the client (as we do for any client and their respective antivirus solution when needed). We wanted our malware to be able to connect back to Metasploit because we love the functionality, we also wanted the capabilities provided by meterpreter, but we needed more than that. We needed our malware to be fully undetectable and to subvert the “Do you want to allow this connection” dialogue box entirely. You can’t do that with encoding…

Update: As of 06/29/2011 9AM EST: this variant of our pseudomalware is being detected by Mcafee.

Update: As of 06/29/2011 10:47AM EST: we’ve created a new variant that seems to bypass any AV.

To make this happen we created a meterpreter C array with the windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp_dns payload. We then took that C array, chopped it up and injected it into our own wrapper of sorts. The wrapper used an undocumented (0-day) technique to completely subvert the dialogue box and to evade detection by Mcafee. When we ran our tests on a machine running Mcafee, the malware ran without a hitch. We should point out that our ability to evade Mcafee isn’t any indication of quality and that we can evade any Antivirus solution using similar custom attack methodologies. After all, its impossible to detect something if you don’t know what it is that you are looking for (It also helps to have a team of researchers at our disposal).

Once we had our malware built we loaded it onto the flash drive that we soldered into our mouse. Then we wrote some code for the teensy microcontroller to launch the malware 60 seconds after the start of user activity. Much of the code was taken from Adrian Crenshaw’s website who deserves credit for giving us this idea in the first place. After a little bit of debugging, our evil mouse named prion was working flawlessly.

Usage: Plug mouse into computer, get pwned.

The last and final step here was to ship the mouse to our customer. One of the most important aspects of this was to repack the mouse in its original package so that it appeared unopened. Then we used Jigsaw to purchase a list of our client’s employes. We did a bit of reconnaissance on each employee and found a target that looked ideal. We packaged the mouse and made it look like a promotional gadget, added fake marketing flyers, etc. then shipped the mouse. Sure enough, three days later the mouse called home.

 

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Netragard Challenges your PCI Compliance

The purpose of legitimate Network Penetration Testing is to positively identify risks in a targeted IT Infrastructure before those risks are identified and exploited by malicious hackers. This enables the IT managers to remediate against those risks before they become an issue. To accomplish this the Penetration Test must be driven by people with at least the same degree of skill and persistence as the threat (defined by the malicious hacker). If the Penetration Test is delivered with a skill set that is less than that of the real threat then the test will likely be ineffective. This would be akin to testing the effectiveness a bullet-proof vest with a squirt gun.

Unfortunately most penetration tests don’t test at realistic threat levels. This is especially true with regards to PCI based penetration tests. Most PCI based penetration testing companies do the bare minimum required to satisfy PCI requirement 11.3. This is problematic because it results in businesses passing their PCI penetration tests when they should have failed and it promotes a false sense of security. The truth is that most businesses that pass their annual PCI audits are still relatively easy to hack. If you don’t believe us then let us prove it and hire us (Netragard) to deliver a conditional penetration test. If we can’t penetrate your network using our unrestricted, advanced methodology then the next test is free. (Challenge ends March, 31st 2011).

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Netragard: Connect to chaos

The Chevy Volt will be the first car of its type: not because it is a hybrid electric/petrol vehicle, but because GM plans to give each one the company sells its own IP address. The Volt will have no less than 100 microcontrollers running its systems from some 10 million lines of code. This makes some hackers very excited and Adriel Desautels, president of security analysis firm Netragard, very worried.  Before now, you needed physical access to reprogram the software inside a car: an ‘air gap’ protected vehicles from remote tampering. The Volt will have no such physical defence. Without some kind of electronic protection, Desautels sees cars such as the Volt and its likely competitors becoming ‘hugely vulnerable 5000lb pieces of metal’.

Desautels adds: “We are taking systems that were not meant to be exposed to the threats that my team produces and plug it into the internet. Some 14 year old kid will be able to attack your car while you’re driving.

The full article can be found here.

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Netragard’s thoughts on Pentesting IPv6 vs IPv4

We’ve heard a bit of “noise” about how IPv6 may impact network penetration testing and how networks may or may not be more secure because of IPv6.  Lets be clear, anyone telling you that IPv6 makes penetration testing harder doesn’t understand the first thing about real penetration testing.

Whats the point of IPv6?

IPv6 was designed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) to address the issue of IPv4 address space exhaustion.  IPv6 uses a 128-bit address space while IPv4 is only 32 bits.  This means that there are 2128 possible addresses with IPv6, which is far more than the 232 addresses available with IPv4.  This means that there are going to be many more potential targets for a penetration tester to focus on when IPv6 becomes the norm.

What about increased security with IPv6?

The IPv6 specification mandates support for the Internet Protocol Security (“IPSec”) protocol suite, which is designed to secure IP communications by authenticating and encrypting each IP Packet. IPSec operates at the Internet Layer of the Internet Protocol suite and so differs from other security systems like the Secure Socket Layer, which operates at the application layer. This is the only significant security enhancement that IPv6 brings to the table and even this has little to no impact on penetration testing.

What some penetration testers are saying about IPv6.

Some penetration testers argue that IPv6 will make the job of a penetration testing more difficult because of the massive increase in potential targets. They claim that the massive increase in potential targets will make the process of discovering live targets impossibly time consuming. They argue that scanning each port/host in an entire IPv6 range could take as long as 13,800,523,054,961,500,000 years.  But why the hell would anyone waste their time testing potential targets when they could be testing actual live targets?

The very first step in any penetration test is effective and efficient reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is the military term for the passive gathering of intelligence about an enemy prior to attacking an enemy.  There are countless ways to perform reconnaissance, all of which must be adapted to the particular engagement.  Failure to adapt will result bad intelligence as no two targets are exactly identical.

A small component of reconnaissance is target identification.  Target identification may or may not be done with scanning depending on the nature of the penetration test.  Specifically, it is impossible to deliver a true stealth / covert penetration test with automated scanners.  Likewise it is very difficult to use a scanner to accuratley identify targets in a network that is protected by reactive security systems (like a well configured IPS that supports black-listing).  So in some/many cases doing discovery by scanning an entire block of addresses is ineffective.

A few common methods for target identification include Social Engineering, DNS enumeration, or maybe something as simple as asking the client to provide you with a list of targets.  Not so common methods involve more aggressive social reconnaissance, continued reconnaissance after initial penetration, etc.  Either way, it will not take 13,800,523,054,961,500,000 years to identify all of the live and accessible targets in an IPv6 network if you know what you are doing.

Additionally, penetration testing against 12 targets in an IPv6 network will take the same amount of time as testing 12 targets in an IPv4 network.  The number of real targets is what is important and not the number of potential targets.  It would be a ridiculous waste of time to test 2128 IPv6 Addresses when only 12 IP addresses are live.  Not to mention that increase in time would likely translate to an increase in project cost.

So in reality, for those who are interested, hacking an IPv6 network won’t be any more or less difficult than hacking an IPv4 network.  Anyone that argues otherwise either doesn’t know what they are doing or they are looking to charge you more money for roughly the same amount of work.

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Bypassing Antivirus to Hack You

Many people assume that running antivirus software will protect them from malware (viruses, worms, trojans, etc), but in reality the software is only partially effective. This is true because antivirus software can only detect malware that it knows to look for. Anything that doesn’t match a known malware pattern will pass as a clean and trusted file.
Antivirus technologies use virus definition files to define known malware patterns. Those patterns are derived from real world malware variants that are captured in the wild. It is relatively easy to bypass most antivirus technologies by creating new malware or modifying existing malware so that it does not contain any identifiable patterns.
One of the modules that our customers can activate when purchasing Penetration Testing services from us, is the Pseudo Malware module. As far as we know, we are one of the few Penetration Testing companies to actually use Pseudo Malware during testing. This module enables our customers to test how effective their defenses are against real world malware threats but in a safe and controllable way.
Our choice of Pseudo Malware depends on the target that we intend to penetrate and the number of systems that we intend to compromise. Sometimes we’ll use Pseudo Malware that doesn’t automatically propagate and other times we’ll use auto-propagation. We should mention that this Pseudo Malware is only “Pseudo” because we don’t do anything harmful with it and we use it ethically. The fact of the matter is that this Pseudo Malware is very real and very capable technology.
Once we’ve determined what Pseudo Malware variant to go with, we need to augment the Pseudo Malware so that it is not detectable by antivirus scanners. We do this by encrypting the Pseudo Malware binary with a special binary encryption tool. This tool ensures that the binary no longer contains patters that are detectable by antivirus technologies.

Before Encryption:


After Encryption: (Still Infected)

As you can see from the scan results above, the Pseudo Malware was detected by most antivirus scanners before it was encrypted. We expected this because we chose a variant of Pseudo Malware that contained several known detectable patterns. The second image (after encryption) shows the same Pseudo Malware being scanned after encryption. As you can see, the Pseudo Malware passed all antivirus scanners as clean.

Now that we’ve prevented antivirus software from being able to detect our Pseudo Malware, we need to distribute it to our victims. Distribution can happen many ways that include but are not limited to infected USB drives, infected CD-ROM’s, Phishing emails augmented by IDN homograph attacks with the Pseudo Malware attached, Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace, binding to PDF like files, etc.

Our preferred method for infection is email (or maybe not). This is because it is usually very easy to gather email addresses using various existing email harvesting technologies and we can hit a large number of people at the same time. When using email, we may embed a link that points directly to our Pseudo Malware, or we might just insert the malware directly into the email. Infection simply requires that the user click our link or run the attached executable. In either case, the Pseudo Malware is fast and quiet and the user doesn’t notice anything strange.

Once a computer is infected with our Pseudo Malware it connects back to our Command and Control server and grants us access to the system unbeknownst to the user. Once we have access we can do anything that the user can do including but not limited to seeing the users screen as if we were right there,
running programs, installing software, uninstalling software, activating web cam’s and microphones, accessing and manipulating hardware, etc. More importantly, we can use that computer to compromise the rest of the network through a process called Distributed Metastasis.

Despite how easy it is to bypass antivirus technologies, we still very strongly recommend using them as they keep you protected from known malware variants.

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Security Vulnerability Penetration Assessment Test?

Our philosophy here at Netragard is that security-testing services must produce a threat that is at least equal to the threat that our customers are likely to face in the real world. If we test our customers at a lesser threat level and a higher-level threat attempts to align with their risks, then they will likely suffer a compromise. If they do suffer a compromise, then the money that they spent on testing services might as well be added to the cost in damages that result from the breach.
This is akin to how armor is tested. Armor is designed to protect something from a specific threat. In order to be effective, the armor is exposed to a level of threat that is slightly higher than what it will likely face in the real world. If the armor is penetrated during testing, it is enhanced and hardened until the threat cannot defeat the armor. If armor is penetrated in battle then there are casualties. That class of testing is called Penetration Testing and the level of threat produced has a very significant impact on test quality and results.

What is particularly scary is that many of the security vendors who offer Penetration Testing services either don’t know what Penetration Testing is or don’t know the definitions for the terms. Many security vendors confuse Penetration Testing with Vulnerability Assessments and that confusion translates to the customer. The terms are not interchangeable and they do not define methodology, they only define testing class. So before we can explain service quality and threat, we must first properly define services.

Based on the English dictionary the word “Vulnerability” is best defined as susceptibility to harm or attack. Being vulnerable is the state of being exposed. The word “Assessment” is best defined as the means by which the value of something is estimated or determined usually through the process of testing. As such, a “Vulnerability Assessment” is a best estimate as to how susceptible something is to harm or attack.

Lets do the same for “Penetration Test”. The word “Penetration” is best defined as the act of entering into or through something, or the ability to make way into or through something. The word “Test” is best defined as the means by which the presence, quality or genuineness of anything is determined. As such the term “Penetration Test” means to determine the presence of points where something can make its way through or into something else.

Despite what many people think, neither term is specific to Information Technology. Penetration Tests and Vulnerability Assessments existed well before the advent of the microchip. In fact, the ancient Romans used a form of penetration testing to test their armor against various types of projectiles. Today, we perform Structural Vulnerability Assessments against things like the Eiffel Tower, and the Golden Gate Bridge. Vulnerability Assessments are chosen because Structural Penetration Tests would cause damage to, or possibly destroy the structure.

In the physical world Penetration Testing is almost always destructive (at least to a degree), but in the digital world it isn’t destructive when done properly. This is mostly because in the digital world we’re penetrating a virtual boundary and in the physical world we’re penetrating a physical boundary. When you penetrate a virtual boundary you’re not really creating a hole, you’re usually creating a process in memory that can be killed or otherwise removed.

When applied to IT Security, a Vulnerability Assessment isn’t as accurate as a Penetration Test. This is because Vulnerability Assessments are best estimates and Penetration Tests either penetrate or they don’t. As such, a quality Vulnerability Assessment report will contain few false positives (false findings) while a quality Penetration Testing report should contain absolutely no false positives. (though they do sometimes contain theoretical findings).

The quality of service is determined by the talent of the team delivering services and by the methodology used for service delivery. A team of research capable ethical hackers that have a background in exploit development and system / network penetration will usually deliver higher quality services than a team of people who are not research capable. If a team claims to be research capable, ask them for example exploit code that they’ve written and ask them for advisories that they’ve published.

Service quality is also directly tied to threat capability. The threat in this case is defined by the capability of real world malicious hackers. If testing services do not produce a threat level that is at least equal to the real world threat, then the services are probably not worth buying. After all, the purpose for security testing is to identify risks so that they can be fixed / patched / eliminated before malicious hackers exploit them. But if the security testing services are less capable than the malicious hacker, then chances are the hacker will find something that the service missed.

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