Exploit Acquisition Program

/Exploit Acquisition Program

Exploit Acquisition Program Shut Down

We’ve decided to terminate our Exploit Acquisition Program (again).   Our motivation for termination revolves around ethics, politics, and our primary business focus.  The HackingTeam breach proved that we could not sufficiently vet the ethics and intentions of new buyers. HackingTeam unbeknownst to us until after their breach was clearly selling their technology to questionable parties, including but not limited to parties known for human rights violations.  While it is not a vendors responsibility to control what a buyer does with the acquired product, HackingTeam’s exposed customer list is unacceptable to us.  The ethics of that are appalling and we want nothing to do with it.

While EAP was an interesting and viable source of information for Netragard it was not nor has it ever been Netragard’s primary business focus. Netragard’s primary focus has always been the delivery of genuine, realistic threat penetration testing services.  While most penetration testing firms deliver vetted vulnerability scans, we deliver genuine tests that replicate real world malicious actors.  These tests are designed to identify vulnerabilities as well as paths to compromise and help to facilitate solid protective plans for our customers.

It is important to mention that we are still in […]

Whistleblower Series – The real problem with China isn’t China, its you.

Terms like China, APT and Zero-Day are synonymous with Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD).  The trouble is that, in our opinion anyway, these terms and respective news articles detract from the actual problem.  For example, in 2011 only 0.12% of compromises were attributed to zero-day exploitation and 99.88% were attributed to known vulnerabilities.  Yet, despite this fact the media continued to write about the zero-day threat as if it was a matter of urgency.  What they really should have been writing about is that the majority of people aren’t protecting their networks properly.  After all, if 99.88% of all compromises were the result of the exploitation of known vulnerabilities then someone must not have been doing their job. Moreover, if people are unable to protect their networks from the known threat then how are they ever going to defend against the unknown?

All of the recent press about China and their Advanced Persistent Threat is the same, it detracts from the real problem.  More clearly, the problem isn’t China, Anonymous, LulzSec, or any other FUD ridden buzzword.  The problem is that networks are not being maintained properly from a security perspective […]

Selling zero-day’s doesn’t increase your risk, here’s why.

The zero-day exploit market is secretive. People as a whole tend to fear what they don’t understand and substitute fact with speculation.  While very few facts about the zero-day exploit market are publicly available, there are many facts about zero-days that are available.  When those facts are studied it becomes clear that the legitimate zero-day exploit market presents an immeasurably small risk (if any), especially when viewed in contrast with known risks.

Many news outlets, technical reporters, freedom of information supporters, and even security experts have used the zero-day exploit market to generate Fear Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD).  While the concept of a zero-day exploit seems ominous reality is actually far less menacing.  People should be significantly more worried about vulnerabilities that exist in public domain than those that are zero-day.  The misrepresentations about the zero-day market create a dangerous distraction from the very real issues at hand.

One of the most common misrepresentations is that the zero-day exploit market plays a major role in the creation of malware and malware’s ability to spread.  Not only is this categorically untrue but the Microsoft Security Intelligence Report (SIRv11) provides clear statistics that show that […]

Netragard on Exploit Brokering

Historically ethical researchers would provide their findings free of charge to software vendors for little more than a mention.  In some cases vendors would react and threaten legal action citing violations of poorly written copyright laws that include but are not limited to the DMCA.  To put this into perspective, this is akin to threatening legal action against a driver for pointing out that the breaks on a school bus are about to fail.

This unfriendliness (among various other things) caused some researchers to withdraw from the practice of full disclosure. Why risk doing a vendor the favor of free work when the vendor might try to sue you?

Organizations like CERT help to reduce or eliminate the risk to security researchers who wish to disclose vulnerabilities.  These organizations work as mediators between the researchers and the vendors to ensure safety for both parties.  Other organizations like iDefense and ZDI also work as middlemen but unlike CERT earn a profit from the vulnerabilities that they purchase. While they may pay a security researcher an average of $500-$5000 per vulnerability, they charge their customers significantly more for their early warning services.  Its also […]

Exploit Acquisition Program – More Details

The recent news on Forbes about our Exploit Acquisition Program has generated a lot of interesting speculative controversy and curiosity. As a result, I’ve decided to take the time to follow up with this blog entry. Here I’ll make a best effort to explain what the Exploit Acquisition Program is, why we decided to launch the program, and how the program works. What it is:The Exploit Acquisition Program (“EAP”) officially started in May of 1999 and is currently being run by Netragard, LLC. EAP specifically designed to acquire “actionable research” in the form of working exploits from the security community. The Exploit Acquisition Program is different than other programs because participants receive significantly higher pay for their work and in most cases the exploits never become public knowledge.The exploits that are acquired via the EAP are sold directly to specific US based clients that have a unique and justifiable need for such technologies. At no point does Netragard sell or otherwise export acquired exploits to any foreign entities. Nor do we disclose any information about our buyers or about participating researchers. Why did we start the […]