Netragard’s Penetration Testing services use a research based methodology called Real Time Dynamic Testing™. Research based methodologies are different in that they focus on identifying both new and known vulnerabilities whereas standard methodologies usually, if not always identify known vulnerabilities. Sometimes when performing research based penetration testing we identify issues that not only affect our customer but also have the potential to impact anyone using a particular technology. Such was the case with the Sonexis ConfrenceManager.
The last time we came across a Sonexis ConferenceManager we found a never before discovered Blind SQL Injection vulnerability. This time we found a much more serious (also never before discovered) authorization vulnerability. We felt that this discovery deserved a blog entry to help make people aware of the issue as quickly as possible.
What really surprised about this vulnerability was its simplicity and the fact that nobody (not even us) had found it before. Discovery and exploitation required no wizardry or special talent. We simply had to browse to the affected area of the application and we were given keys to the kingdom (literally). What was even more scary is that this vulnerability could lead to a mass compromise if automated with a specialized Google search (but we won’t give more detail on that here, yet).
So lets dig in…
All versions of the Sonexis ConferenceManager fail to check and see if users attempting to access the “/admin/backup/settings.asp”, “/admin/backup/download.asp ” or the “/admin/backup/upload.asp ” pages are authorized. Because of this, anyone can browse to one of those pages without first authenticating. When they do, they’ll have full administrative privileges over the respective Sonexis ConferenceManager pages. A screen shot of the “settings.asp” age is provided below.
The first thing that we noticed when we accessed the page was that the fields were […]